We study school switching in a setting where oversubscribed secondary schools use lotteries for admission. Many students switch schools during secondary education, including those initially placed at their top choice. Using students’ ranking for secondary schools, we assess the strength of preferences and show that stronger preferences predict lower switching rates. Students who have an unexpected top choice are thus more likely to switch schools to another school in later years. School switching may have negative consequences for the student’s learning trajectory. Furthermore, if the student is initially assigned to an oversubscribed school, school switching causes an inefficient allocation of students at popular schools. We explore adjustments to the lottery mechanism to reduce later switching. Our simulations show that school switching can only be reduced if students are denied access to schools which would be unexpected choices for them.
LEARN! Research Seminar by Bas van der Klaauw 24 juni 2025 16:00 - 17:00
Over LEARN! Research Seminar by Bas van der Klaauw
Startdatum
- 24 juni 2025
Tijd
- 16:00 - 17:00
Taal
- Engels
Prof. Bas van der Klaauw
Bas van der Klaauw (PhD Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) is professor in policy evaluation and director of Tinbergen Institute. The Tinbergen Institute is the research school of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the University of Amsterdam that also hosts research master programs in Economics, Economics, Finance and in Business Data Science. For his research, Bas van der Klaauw uses microeconometric methods for causal analysis in the field of labor, education and health. In 2008 he received an ERC Starting Grant and in 2016 a VICI grant from NWO. In the past he held visiting positions at the University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University. Currently, he is associated to IZA-Bonn and CEPR-London. He has been program director of the MSc economics at the Vrije Universiteit and chair of the educational board at Tinbergen Institute.
