Introducing an Upcoming Guest Lecture (10 February 2026)
Written by Shadan Jagersma, Lara Lamie and Anshika Dwivedi
Abstract
In April 2025, Zamzam camp in North Darfur - one of the largest displacement sites in Sudan - was violently attacked by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Over the span of three days, civilians were looted, killed, subjected to sexual violence, and again displaced, while essential infrastructure was destroyed. This blog examines whether the alleged violations may be legally qualified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide under international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and what the Zamzam case reveals about the limits of civilian protection in practice. By combining legal analysis with survivor testimony, it highlights the gap between the promises of international law and the lived reality of displaced communities in Darfur.
Keywords: Zamzam Camp, Darfur, Sudan War, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, Ethnic Violence
Introduction
In April 2025, Zamzam camp in North Darfur, home to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), was attacked by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in one of the most devastating episodes of Sudan’s ongoing civil war.[1]Established in 2004 during the Darfur genocide, Zamzam had long been seen as a place of relative safe refuge for civilians fleeing ethnic violence. Between 11 and 13 April, it was almost entirely destroyed.
United Nations (UN) bodies and human rights organisations documented mass killings, sexual and gender-based violence, forced displacement, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure during the RSF assault.[2] The attack deepened an already catastrophic humanitarian crisis and raised urgent legal questions about accountability, civilian protection, and the possible resurgence of genocide in Darfur.[3]
This blog examines whether the alleged violations may be legally qualified as war crimes, crimes against humanity (CAH), or genocide under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL), and what the Zamzam case reveals about the limits of civilian protection in practice. It argues that the violence committed in Zamzam may constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potentially genocide, while highlighting the persistent gap between international legal obligations and their enforcement. To bridge the divide between abstract legal categories and reality, the analysis incorporates the survivor’s account of Hamed.[4]
RSF offensive on Darfur’s Zamzam camp
Between 11 and 13 April 2025, the RSF launched a large-scale offensive on the Zamzam camp, which had been established in North Darfur in 2004 and sheltered an estimated 700,000 civilians already displaced by decades of conflict. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the assault involved coordinated ground incursions, artillery shelling, and the use of heavy weapons by RSF fighters, resulting in widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and displacement of camp residents.[5] The OHCHR report describes “three days of terror with no safe refuge”, documenting serious violations of IHL and human rights law during and after the offensive.[6] Moreover, the report concluded that at least 406,265 IDPs were displaced to various localities across Darfur, resulting in mass displacement.[7]
Amnesty International’s comprehensive report, A Refuge Destroyed, corroborates that from 11 to 13 April, the RSF indiscriminately deployed explosive weapons in densely populated residential areas, deliberately killed civilians, took hostages, and destroyed mosques, schools, and health clinics, which are all core elements of civilian life that enjoy protection.[8] This conduct constitutes prima facie violations of customary IHL, including the principle of distinction and the prohibition of attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as defined in the International Committee of the Red Cross’ study on customary IHL in rules 1, 7 and 9.[9]
Eyewitness accounts reported by Amnesty International documented RSF fighters shooting at civilians in homes, markets, and places of refuge.[10] This offensive formed part of the RSF’s broader campaign to seize control of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, intensifying an already catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Darfur, where millions have been displaced and basic services shattered by prolonged conflict.[11] The assault effectively emptied the camp, destroyed sources of food and medical care, and exacerbated famine conditions in an area already facing severe shortages of water and aid. Humanitarian access was further restricted by communications blackouts imposed by RSF, which inhibited real-time reporting and response.
Realities of the attack
International law offers essential categories for classifying the atrocities committed in Zamzam camp; however, those categories can also obscure how such violations are experienced by those who endure them. Framed in terms of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, such violence can become - whether consciously or not - a distant spectacle for external audiences. Yet behind these legal categories and the large numbers of victims, are real people, often marked by trauma, fear, and loss.
An interview with 36-year-old humanitarian worker Hamed, conducted just a few weeks after the attack, offers insight into a lived reality. Victim testimony is a recognised source of legally relevant evidence in ICL and plays a central role in establishing both the factual and contextual elements of international crimes.[12] International tribunals have consistently relied on survivor accounts to determine the material circumstances of violations and patterns of conduct, while UN fact-finding mechanisms treat such testimony as indispensable to documenting atrocities and assessing compliance with international law.[13] Including this perspective therefore strengthens the legal analysis by situating doctrinal assessments within the lived realities of those most directly affected by the violations.
Originally from Darfur, Hamed was residing in Zamzam camp and assisting other displaced persons during the RSF attack. Zamzam was widely perceived as a space of relative safety. As Hamed recalled: “This camp is for innocent civilians. We never thought they would come. Not here.” When the attack began, Hamed hid for three days in a hole in the sandy ground, without access to food or water. What remained constant were the sounds of bombs, screams, and gunfire. After three days, he fled the camp on foot under cover of darkness. Together with other men, and alongside thousands of fleeing civilians, he walked for nineteen hours to reach Tawila.
During this flight, he witnessed widespread looting, rape, children being beaten, and indiscriminate violence against civilians by RSF fighters. Hamed himself was shot at multiple times while fleeing. Without prompting, Hamed explained the logic he perceived behind the violence: “They treat you badly because you’re from a tribe they don’t like. They kill all Black people - just because of our skin colour.” Hamed is from the Zaghawa tribe. In Sudan, tribal affiliation and perceived racial identity profoundly shape how individuals are treated, particularly in the context of the current conflict. His account reflects a broader pattern reported by multiple Darfuri survivors: violence structured along ethnic and racial lines, as described in further depth in this blog.
In Tawila, physical safety remains precarious and survival is defined by deprivation. Access to food, clean water, and medical care is severely limited, and the fear of renewed displacement is constant. As Hamed stated: “I will never be able to go home again. If you go back, you will be shot.”
Humanitarian responses
On the ground, humanitarian assistance is sustained largely through local and Sudanese-led initiatives operating under extreme conditions. Community-based Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), established by volunteers across Sudan, provide food distribution, basic medical assistance, and evacuation support where formal humanitarian access is obstructed. Women-led organisations and Darfuri civil society groups, including networks documenting sexual and gender-based violence, play a critical role in supporting survivors and preserving evidence despite significant personal risk. International humanitarian organisations and Sudanese Red Crescent volunteers continue to operate where possible, but their reach is severely constrained by insecurity, access restrictions, and deliberate obstruction.
The destruction of Zamzam camp thus represents more than a violation of IHL. It marks the collapse of a civilian refuge, and the deliberate targeting of a population already shaped by repeated displacement and ethnic violence. The lived experiences of survivors such as Hamed underscore that the atrocities committed in Zamzam were neither random nor inevitable, but rather the result of patterns of violence that international law is intended - yet has so far failed - to prevent.
Protection of civilians and displaced persons under International Humanitarian Law
IHL has established a concrete foundation for limiting the impacts of armed conflict.[14] Furthermore, applying this concept to the violence at Zamzam camp explains how the acts might constitute a major breach of international law.
The Geneva Conventions (1949), ratified by Sudan in 1957, establish the core treaty framework for the protection of civilians and other persons hors de combat during armed conflict. In all four treaties, the Common Article 3 is consistent, which mandates humane treatment for anybody who does not participate in hostilities and outlaws acts such as aggression against life and person, cruel treatment and torture, and hostage-taking.[15] This article is binding in every non‑international armed conflict (NIAC). A violation of the provision requires two elements to be satisfied: first, the existence of a NIAC; and second, that the victims must not be “active participants in hostilities”.
In the present case, the first criterion is satisfied, as demonstrated by the legal test for the existence of a non-international armed conflict articulated by the ICTY in Tadić.[16] Under this test, a NIAC exists where there is sustained violence of sufficient intensity and the involvement of at least one sufficiently organised non-state armed group. At the Zamzam IDP camp, the UN reported that the RSF conducted multi-day coordinated military operations using heavy weapons, resulting in the deaths of over 1,000 civilians in three days only.[17] Amnesty International and OHCHR also document the deliberate attacks on civilians and the destruction of infrastructure.[18] These acts show both the intensity and the capacity of the RSF organisation. Therefore, these acts meet the criteria for the existence of a NIAC under IHL. The second criterion is met as the camp was made up of civilians and displaced families.
How a violation becomes an international crime
Violations of Common Article 3 constitute war crimes under Article 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, which can escalate to crimes against humanity.[19] Furthermore, if RSF activities are attributed to Sudan as organs or de facto organs, the state is responsible. Sudan is obligated to safeguard its population, regardless of who is responsible.
Furthermore, the Genocide Convention (1948) defines and criminalises the crime of genocide under international law, making it a requirement for member states to prohibit and punish such acts. Article II of this convention defines genocide to be “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.” These acts include: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious physical or mental harm to members of the group; (c) intentionally subjecting the group to living conditions intended to cause its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures aimed at preventing the birth of children within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children from one group to another group.[20] Central to the legal determination of genocide is the requirement of dolus specialis, or specific intent, meaning that the prohibited acts must be carried out with the purpose of destroying the protected group. Importantly, the actus reus (prohibited acts) elements need not occur cumulatively; the commission of any one of the enumerated acts, when accompanied by the requisite intent, is sufficient to constitute genocide.
From the above legal articles its clear that three elements need to be present to establish genocide. The elements are a protected group, one or more prohibited acts, and specific intent. Nations, ethnic, racial, and religious groups are protected under the Genocide Convention. While civilians as such do not constitute a protected group under the Genocide Convention, evidence suggests that individuals in Zamzam were targeted on the basis of ethnic and racial identity, potentially bringing the violence within the Convention’s protected categories.
The UN claims that civilian fatalities in Darfur fall within Article II’s prohibition of (a) mass violence against specific ethnic groups. During attacks on the camp, the OHCHR describes the deplorable use of sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, and sexual enslavement. Such acts constitute serious bodily and mental harm under Article II(b) of the Genocide Convention when committed against members of a protected group. According to Amnesty International reports, the RSF have severely damaged schools, set houses on fire, destroyed mosques, and damaged many other infrastructures; as a result, they have met (c) the need to demolish buildings, shelters, and safe zones. These acts show that more than one of the acts specified in Article II of the Genocide Convention exists. While the above actions show the fulfilment of the material elements of genocide, international law, although very hard, also requires proof of explicit intent to eliminate a protected ethnic group. At present, establishing the existence of the requisite dolus specialis remains legally contested and evidentially challenging in the Zamzam context.
Who is responsible, and what does international law require in response?
Accountability can be understood as the legal obligation of individuals, organisations, or public officials regarding their actions, justify their decisions and accept responsibility for the consequences of their conduct. Accountability here may be understood at two levels. Firstly, individuals, such as direct perpetrators, political leaders, or perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence, can be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity. These individuals may face prosecution in their own country or abroad. This is the result of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) power over Darfur under UN Security Council Resolution 1593, which grants the ICC the legal ability to investigate and prosecute crimes committed there.
A second layer of accountability arises at the level of the international community. These obligations stem from customary international law, which develops through consistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris, that is, the belief by states that such practice is carried out of a sense of legal obligation. Consequently, the commission of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity constitutes a violation of jus cogens norms, giving rise to erga omnes obligations owed to the international community as a whole.[21] In response to such violations, states are legally required to cooperate in preventing further atrocities and to support accountability mechanisms, including judicial institutions such as the ICC.
Conclusion
This article asked whether the April 2025 attack by the RSF on the Zamzam camp can be legally qualified as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide under in IHL and ICL. The destruction of the Zamzam camp was not an isolated incident but one that illustrates the violence that has marked the current war. Indeed, when applying the facts of the actions currently recorded, the RSF’s assault does meet the criteria to amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, while reviving unresolved questions about genocidal violence in Darfur due to the complicity of meeting the dolus specialis element.
Yet legal labels alone cannot capture the reality of what occurred. Survivor accounts reveal how international crimes are experienced as fear, loss, and permanent displacement, often structured along ethnic and racial lines. For many Darfuris, Zamzam’s destruction marks not just another displacement, but the loss of any realistic prospect of safety or return.
International law imposes clear obligations to protect civilians, prevent atrocity crimes, and ensure accountability. The events of April 2025 show how fragile those commitments remain when enforcement fails. Zamzam stands as a stark reminder that civilian protection is not an abstract legal principle, but a lived necessity - and that failures of enforcement translate directly into permanent displacement, trauma, and loss.
Bibliography
Secondary Sources
Ahmed K, ‘“They chanted as they killed people in their homes”: survivors describe attack on Sudan’s Zamzam camp’ The Guardian (London, 18 April 2025)
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/18/survivors-attack-sudan-zamzam-camp-rapid-support-forces-paramilitaries accessed 16 January 2026.
Amnesty International, A Refugee Destroyed: RSF Violations in Darfur’s Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons (2 December 2025)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/0509/2025/en/ accessed 16 January 2026.
Amnesty International, Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in West Darfur (AFR 54/9201/2025, May 2024).
Baallout M, ‘The Sudan War: Illusions of Decisiveness and Bitter Solutions?’ (2023) 16(3) Contemporary Arab Affairs.
Emergency Response Rooms (Right Livelihood, 2025) https://rightlivelihood.org/the-change-makers/find-a-laureate/emergency-response-rooms/ accessed 20 January 2026.
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Princewill N, ‘Bloodbath feared as rebels trap thousands in Sudan city. How did we get here and what might come next?’ CNN (29 October 2025) https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/28/africa/sudan-rsf-takes-el-fasher-intl accessed on 20 January 2026.
Roberts L, ‘Tracking the Toll of Sudan’s Forgotten War from Afar’ (2025) 387(6737) Science 914.
SIHA Network, ‘Press Statement: Current Update on Atrocities at Zamzam Displacement Camp, North Darfur’ (27 May 2025)
https://sihanet.org/press-statement-current-update-on-atrocities-at-zamzam-displacement-camp-north-darfur/ accessed 16 January 2026.
Townsend M, ‘Assault on Sudan’s Zamzam refugee camp may have killed more than 1,500 civilians’ The Guardian (London, 7 August 2025)
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/aug/07/zamzam-massacre-rapid-support-forces-rsf-militia-civilians-slaughtered accessed 19 January 2026.
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https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145432 accessed 16 January 2026.
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Conference and Institutional Materials
‘Statutory Meetings - Reinforcing Respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL)’
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[1] Townsend M “Assault on Sudan’s Zamzam refugee camp may have killed more than 1,500 civilians” The Guardian (7 August 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/aug/07/zamzam-massacre-rapid-support-forces-rsf-militia-civilians-slaughtered> accessed on 19 January 2026.
[2] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commisioner, ‘Report of OHCHR Sudan Country Office on the offensive of the Rapid Support Forces on Zamzam IDP camp, North Darfur (11-13 April 2025): “Three days of terror with no safe refuge”’ (18 December 2025) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-offensive-rapid-support-forces-zamzam> accessed on 16 January 2026; Amnesty International ‘A Refugee Destroyed: RSF Violations in Darfur’s Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons’ (2 December 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/0509/2025/en/> accessed on 16 January 2026.
[3] E.g., M Baallout, ‘The Sudan War: Illusions of Decisiveness and Bitter Solutions?’ (2023) 16(3) Contemporary Arab Affairs 253; Leslie Roberts, ‘Tracking the Toll of Sudan’s Forgotten War from Afar’ (2025) 387(6737) Science 914;Amnesty International, Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in West Darfur (AFR 54/9201/2025, May 2024); United Nations, ‘Sudan: Atrocities ‘repeated town by town’, ICC prosecutor tells UN Security Council’ UN News (20 January 2026)
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166790 accessed 20 January 2026.
[4] “Hamed” is an alias. An interview was conducted with Hamed by Lara Lamie in May 2025; interview materials and contact details of “Hamed” are in her possession and cannot be made public due to security reasons.
[5] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Report of OHCHR Sudan Country Office on the Offensive of the Rapid Support Forces on Zamzam IDP Camp, North Darfur (11–13 April 2025): “Three Days of Terror with No Safe Refuge” (18 December 2025) https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-offensive-rapid-support-forces-zamzam accessed 16 January 2026.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Amnesty International ‘A Refugee Destroyed: RSF Violations in Darfur’s Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons’ (2 December 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/0509/2025/en/> accessed on 16 January 2026.
[9] Henckaerts J-M and Doswald-Beck L, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Vol I, Cambridge University Press 2009) Rule 1, 7, 9.
[10] Amnesty International ‘A Refugee Destroyed: RSF Violations in Darfur’s Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons’ (2 December 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/0509/2025/en/> accessed on 16 January 2026.
[11] Princewill N, ‘Bloodbath feared as rebels trap thousands in Sudan city. How did we get here and what might come next?’ CNN (29 October 2025) https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/28/africa/sudan-rsf-takes-el-fasher-intl accessed on 20 January 2026.
[12] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 arts 68(3), 69(3); ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted 9 September 2002, entered into force 1 July 2002) ICC-ASP/1/3 rules 63(2), 85.
[13] Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-94-1-T (7 May 1997) paras 653–654; UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 January 2005) UN Doc S/2005/60 paras 23–26.
[14] “Statutory Meetings - Reinforcing Respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL)” <https://rcrcconference.org/pledge/reinforcing-respect-for-international-humanitarian-law-ihl/?utm_source=copilot.com>.
[15] “Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions, 1949 in the Era of International Criminal Tribunals - [2001] ISILYBIHRL 11” <http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/11.html>.
[16] T. Gal, “Unexplored Outcomes of TADI : Applicability of the Law of Occupation to War by Proxy” (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 59 <https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqt076>.
[17] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human Rights Situation in the Sudan” <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/ohchr-report-human-rights-situation-in-sudan-1-january-30-juin-2025.pdf>.
[18] Amnesty International, “Sudan: Rapid Support Forces’ Ruthless Attack on Zamzam Camp Should Be Investigated for War Crimes” (Amnesty International, December 4, 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/sudan-rapid-support-forces-ruthless-attack-on-zamzam-camp-should-be-investigated-for-war-crimes>.
[19]Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).
[20] United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (1948) <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf>.
[21] Masahiko Asada, “Identification and Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law” <https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2025/english/annex3.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com>.