In recent years, numerous research studies have highlighted that CPU microarchitecture designs are crucial not only for performance but also for security. The release of Spectre and Meltdown in 2018 marked a significant turning point, revealing how microarchitectural optimizations could unintentionally introduce critical vulnerabilities that are exceptionally difficult to address due to the immutability of hardware after production. This thesis conducts an in-depth exploration of CPU microarchitectures, uncovering new attack surfaces and proposing optimizations to enhance defenses. Specifically, it evaluates the limitations of existing hardware mitigations against Spectre, demonstrating their insufficiencies and exposing pathways for continued exploitation. Furthermore, the research identifies previously unexamined root causes of transient execution vulnerabilities, leading to the discovery of new classes of attacks. In addition, by addressing key microarchitectural bottlenecks, this work introduces a novel way to accelerate memory error detection, a crucial aspect of software security assessment. By bridging the gap between hardware and software perspectives, this research deepens our understanding of CPU microarchitectures, paving the way for more secure and efficient computing systems.
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