There is a registration fee of 50 euro for registrations until the 31st of May. Afterwards, the registration fee increases to 60 euro. You will receive a full refund for cancellations before the 31st of May. Please fill out the registration form to participate in the event. We appreciate early registrations for organisational purposes.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Tim Oosterwijk.

Venue

The workshop will take place in the Main Building (Hoofdgebouw) of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, room HG-12A00 on Thursday and HG-02A00 on Friday. This is at walking distance from the railway and metro station Amsterdam Zuid. Once inside, turn left to take the elevators or stairs of the A-wing to the 12th or 2nd floor.

Accommodation

Some recommendations for accommodation in the area are Holiday Inn, Motel One and the Ibis Budget hotel. Since the venue is easy to reach by public transport, please feel free to book any accommodation in the general area.

Keynote Speakers

Edith Elkind, University of Oxford
Title: Mind the gap: fair division with separation constraints
Abstract: Motivated by the social distancing rules, we consider the task of fairly sharing a divisible good among several agents in a setting where every two agents' shares must be separated. We first look at the case where the good is the [0, 1] segment (usually referred to as `cake'). In this model, the separation constraint is captured by specifying a parameter s such that for every pair of agents i, j their shares are separated by a segment of length at least s; intuitively, the cake is cut by a blunt knife of width s. We focus on the recently introduced fairness concept of maximin fair share, and show that each agent can be guaranteed her maximin fair share; however, computing the agents' fair shares is computationally hard. We then extend our analysis to richer models, such as a 2-dimensional cake (where we have additional restrictions on the shapes of agents' pieces) and graphical cake (where agents need to share edges of a graph), and obtain positive results for an ordinal relaxation of the maximin fair share solution concept.

Neil Olver, London School of Economics and Political Science
Title: Understanding equilibria in flow-over-time traffic models
Abstract: Network congestion games are by now a standard, extensively studied topic in algorithmic game theory. Dynamic models of transport and network traffic, where traffic flows and congestion vary over time, bring with them many new challenges. This talk will give an overview of the deterministic queueing model, a fundamental model of this type with roots that go back to Ford and Fulkerson (from the perspective of network flows) and Vickrey (from the perspective of transportation economics).  I will survey both older and very recent results about dynamic equilibria, which exhibit surprisingly rich behaviour and are still quite poorly understood.

Tentative Schedule

Thursday June 15, HG-12A00

Friday June 16, HG-02A00