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13th Day on Computational Game Theory

15 June 2023 - 16 June 2023

The 13th Day on Computational Game Theory will be hosted by the department of Operations Analytics at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The Day on Computational Game Theory brings together researchers in Computer Science, Operations Research and Economics, who are interested in algorithmic or computational aspects of game theory, social choice and related areas. It provides an opportunity to foster collaboration, present research and exchange ideas in an informal and relaxed atmosphere.

There is a registration fee of 50 euro for registrations until the 31st of May. Afterwards, the registration fee increases to 60 euro. You will receive a full refund for cancellations before the 31st of May. Please fill out the registration form to participate in the event. We appreciate early registrations for organisational purposes.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Tim Oosterwijk.


The workshop will take place in the Main Building (Hoofdgebouw) of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, room HG-12A00 on Thursday and HG-02A00 on Friday. This is at walking distance from the railway and metro station Amsterdam Zuid. Once inside, turn left to take the elevators or stairs of the A-wing to the 12th or 2nd floor.


Some recommendations for accommodation in the area are Holiday Inn, Motel One and the Ibis Budget hotel. Since the venue is easy to reach by public transport, please feel free to book any accommodation in the general area.

Keynote Speakers

Edith Elkind, University of Oxford
Title: Mind the gap: fair division with separation constraints
Abstract: Motivated by the social distancing rules, we consider the task of fairly sharing a divisible good among several agents in a setting where every two agents' shares must be separated. We first look at the case where the good is the [0, 1] segment (usually referred to as `cake'). In this model, the separation constraint is captured by specifying a parameter s such that for every pair of agents i, j their shares are separated by a segment of length at least s; intuitively, the cake is cut by a blunt knife of width s. We focus on the recently introduced fairness concept of maximin fair share, and show that each agent can be guaranteed her maximin fair share; however, computing the agents' fair shares is computationally hard. We then extend our analysis to richer models, such as a 2-dimensional cake (where we have additional restrictions on the shapes of agents' pieces) and graphical cake (where agents need to share edges of a graph), and obtain positive results for an ordinal relaxation of the maximin fair share solution concept.

Neil Olver, London School of Economics and Political Science
Title: Understanding equilibria in flow-over-time traffic models
Abstract: Network congestion games are by now a standard, extensively studied topic in algorithmic game theory. Dynamic models of transport and network traffic, where traffic flows and congestion vary over time, bring with them many new challenges. This talk will give an overview of the deterministic queueing model, a fundamental model of this type with roots that go back to Ford and Fulkerson (from the perspective of network flows) and Vickrey (from the perspective of transportation economics).  I will survey both older and very recent results about dynamic equilibria, which exhibit surprisingly rich behaviour and are still quite poorly understood.


You can find the abstracts here

Download the schedule here

Thursday June 15, HG-12A00

13.00Registration and coffee
13.40Keynote talk Neil Olver: Understanding equilibria in flow-over-time traffic models

Lukas Graf: Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria

Wouter Fokkema: The Price of Anarchy for Matroid Congestion Games

Svenja M. Griesbach: Information Design for Congestion Games with Unknown Demand

15.40Break and group photo

Pieter Kleer: Optimal Stopping Theory for a Distributionally Robust Seller

Elias Pitschmann: Prophet Inequalities over Time

Anh Trieu: Matching maximizing mechanism in a two-sided auction setting


Katharina Eickhoff: Walrasian Prices – Computation and Properties

Niklas Rieken: Selling a Base of a Matroid

Artem Tsikiridis: Fractional Budget-feasible Mechanism Design

18.30End of program
19.00Dinner at De Veranda

Friday June 16, HG-02A00

09.00Keynote talk Edith Elkind: Mind the gap: fair division with separation constraints

Hannaneh Akrami: Breaking the 3/4 Barrier for Approximate Maximin Share

Javier Cembrano: Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection

Konstantinos Varsos: Forward Looking Best-Response Multiplicative Weights Update Methods for Bilinear Zero-sum Games


Gabriele Dragotto: Integer Programming Games: Do We Really Need Them?

Maximilian Stahlberg: Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs

Koosha Samieefar: The Computational Complexity of Mixed Constrained Equilibria and Applications.

12.30Lunch at The Basket

Niklas Hahn: Online TSP with Predictions on Locations

Golnoosh Shahkarami: A Novel Prediction Setup for Online Speed-Scaling

Sophie Rain: Game Theory for Automated Verification of Protocols


About 13th Day on Computational Game Theory

Starting date

  • 15 June 2023 - 16 June 2023


  • VU main building
  • 12A00


  • De Boelelaan 1105
  • 1081HV Amsterdam

Organised by

  • Department of Operations Analytics


  • English